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Adversarial attacks have been alerting the artificial intelligence community recently, since many machine learning
algorithms were found vulnerable to malicious attacks. This paper studies adversarial attacks to scale-free networks
to test their robustness in terms of statistical measures. In addition to the well-known random link rewiring (RLR)
attack, two heuristic attacks are formulated and simulated: degree-addition-based link rewiring (DALR) and degree-
interval-based link rewiring (DILR). These three strategies are applied to attack a number of strong scale-free networks
of various sizes generated from the Barabási-Albert model. It is found that both DALR and DILR are more effective
than RLR, in the sense that rewiring a smaller number of links can succeed in the same attack. However, DILR is as
concealed as RLR in the sense that they both are constructed by introducing a relatively small number of changes on
several typical structural properties such as average shortest path-length, average clustering coefficient, and average
diagonal distance. The results of this paper suggest that to classify a network to be scale-free has to be very careful
from the viewpoint of adversarial attack effects.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scale-free networks are ubiquitous in nature and society,
from email networks1 to cell networks2, from World-Wide
Web3 to social networks4, and beyond. In a scale-free net-
work, few nodes have large numbers of connected links, ex-
hibiting remarkable heterogeneity in node degrees. This spe-
cial feature makes them be highly robust against random at-
tacks but extremely vulnerable to targeted attacks, which is
known as the Achilles Heel effect.
Since the influential report on scale-free networks5, re-
ferred to as the Barabási-Albert (BA) network model, there
have been a lot of studies6,7. Generally, a network is consid-
ered to be scale free if its degree distribution follows a power-
law form, i.e., p(k) ∼ k−α , where k is the node degree and
α is the power-law exponent. In some cases, the definition is
stricter. For example, it may require that the power-law ex-
ponent satisfies α ∈ (2,3) or its generation mechanism has a
preferential attachment operation8. In some other cases, the
definition is broader. For example, it may only require the up-
per tail of the degree distribution curve to satisfy the power-
law form9, or its log-log curve is nearly straight. The discus-
sions on the definition of a scale-free network has attracted
considerable attention since the early 2018, when Broido and
Clauset10 proposed a classification method to estimate the
strength of the scale-free attribute of a network. They tested
nearly 1,000 real networks and concluded that scale-free net-
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works are rare. Yet, Barabási11 believes that there are some
deficiencies in their preprocessing of the real network data:
when transforming a network to several simple degree se-
quences, the weights for various degree sequences should be
different. Voitalov et al.12 pointed out that if the fitted model
is a pure power-law model, there is no question that scale-free
networks are rare, but in real life, due to the existence of noise,
sampling or other processing factors, it is not possible to ob-
tain a pure power-law distribution. Coincidentally, in machine
learning, there are many recent studies showing that it is quite
possible to output an erroneous result when some slight dis-
turbance such as noise is applied to the input data, which is
called adversarial attack13. Consequently, a great deal of in-
terest is aroused to revisit the notion of adversarial attacks.
Noise plays an important role in many aspects of data anal-
ysis. Since deep learning is widely used in computer vi-
sion14,15, there are a number of studies on algorithm robust-
ness16–19. It was found that changing a few pixels in an image
could make the classification result totally wrong or different.
The reason is that the feature vector of the image will change
when a pixel is modified, which can fool many deep learning
algorithms. For example, Su et al.17 changed only one pixel in
an image, they were able to destroy many intrinsic properties
of the image and fool a deep neural network. Besides, there
are many other ways to add such disturbances to an image,
e.g., FGSM20, ILCM21, DEEPFOOL18, and so on. Most of
these methods can only generate a specific disturbance for a
specific image, instead Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.22 created gen-
eral perturbations for a bunch of images, making the situations
even worse, since such disturbances are not easily identifiable
by human.
Besides computer vision, in the area of network science
it was also found that simple purposeful modifications to an
original network, i.e. by rewiring links, adding/deleting nodes
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or changing nodes’ attributes, can significantly change the
network properties and thus greatly disturb the graph algo-
rithms23. Recently, a number of strategies were proposed to
attack link prediction24,25, node classification26, and commu-
nity detection27. For instance, Yu et al.28 proposed heuris-
tic and evolutionary algorithms to protect targeted links from
link-prediction-based attacks. Zügner et al. 29 considered at-
tacking node classification, and introduced NETTACK based
on a graph convolutional network (GCN) to generate adver-
sarial attack iteratively. Chen et al.27 used genetic algorithm
(GA)-based Q-attack to destroy the community structure of a
network, where the modularity Q is used to design the fitness
function.
On the other hand, p-value is dominant in statistical analy-
sis, which however has been questioned before30. Today, the
p-value measure has been re-examined and advanced to a new
climax31. More than 800 reports pointed out that the sample
size has a great impact on the p-value. By adding or subtract-
ing some data, which can be considered as noise, one will get a
different result compared with the original one. This explains
why most experimental results obtained by using p-values are
difficult to reproduce.
The reality is, unfortunately, what you see from the data
may not mean what they really are. In other words, the al-
gorithms and models developed based on real data could be
vulnerable to tiny noise and purposefully designed noise-like
perturbations. Therefore, the robustness of machine learning
algorithms attracts more and more attention from the Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AI) community. The robustness of many
physical criteria, especially those based on data, have to be
examined to ensure that they are reliable.
Motivated by the above discussions, in this paper, a new
type of adversarial attack is introduced to the robustness of
physical criteria on scale-free networks. Specifically, three at-
tack strategies are used to evaluate the robustness of the clas-
sification method proposed for scale-free networks10. To be
convincing, the Barabási-Albert (BA) model is used to gener-
ate 100 strong scale-free networks of different sizes for test-
ing the attacks in experiments, by rewiring some links of these
networks until the Broido-Clauset (BC)10 classification goes
wrong. The results show that the BC classification can be eas-
ily fooled by rewiring only a small fraction of links.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as fol-
lows.
• A new adversarial attack is introduced onto the physi-
cal criteria of scale-free networks to evaluate the robust-
ness of the scale-free measure.
• Two heuristic attack strategies, namely degree-
addition-based link rewiring (DALR) and degree-
interval-based link rewiring (DILR), are introduced.
Several structural metrics are proposed to measure the
effectiveness and concealment of the attack strategies.
• It is found that both DALR and DILR are more effective
than random link rewiring (RLR), in terms of rewiring
fewer links to successfully attack strong scale-free net-
works, so that the networks become other types. It is
also found that DILR is as concealed as RLR in that
they both are constructed by introducing a relatively
small number of changes on several typical structural
properties such as average shortest path-length, average
clustering coefficient, and average diagonal distance.
Therefore, the results of this paper suggest that to clas-
sify a network to be scale-free has to be very careful
from the viewpoint of adversarial attack effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The BC classi-
fication of scale-free networks is introduced in Sec. II. Three
adversarial attack strategies are proposed in Sec. III. Some
metrics for attack effectiveness and concealment are discussed
with experimental results reported in Sec. IV. Conclusions are
drawn in Sec. V.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF SCALE-FREE NETWORKS
Here, the classification of scale-free networks proposed by
Broido and Clauset10 is reviewed, which is referred to as the
BC classification below.
• First, preprocessing the real-world network data. Com-
mon analysis typically relies on the scale-free hypothe-
sis to determine whether a network is scale-free or not.
This hypothesis states that a network is scale-free if its
degree distribution follows a power-law form, where
only the information of node degree is taken into ac-
count. While real-world networks carry many irrele-
vant attributes such as link weights, connection direc-
tions, etc., which make it inconvenient to estimate the
strength of the scale-free attribute. Thus, the BC classi-
fication suggests to first convert the original network to
a set of simple graphs, where one can apply the scale-
free hypothesis to each graph. In this way, one can ob-
tain several degree sequences. For example, from a di-
rected network, one can get an in-degree sequence and
an out-degree sequence (see Fig. 1). To that end, one
can put all the degree sequences in a set, S.
• Second, estimating the strength of scale-free attribute.
Several indicators are used in BC classification to es-
timate the strength of scale-free attribute for a given
network, which are listed in TABLE I, where R is one
newly proposed here to evaluate the best fit model.
• Third, classifying the networks. According to the above
two steps, one can determine the strength of the scale-
free attribute of a network, based on which, the real net-
works in examination were divided into six categories:
strongest, strong, weak, weakest, super-weak, and non-
scale-free, as shown in Fig. 2. It can be seen that the
strongest, strong, weak, and weakest classes are nested,
indicating that the strength of the scale-free attribute
becomes weaker gradually. The super-weak class in-
dicates that the networks are extremely weak in scale-
free attribute, which only requires that the optimal dis-
tribution is in a power-law form. Networks that do not
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FIG. 1. Preprocessing of a real-world network under the BC classification framework. Taking a directed network as an example, the directed
attribute is removed and both in-degree and out-degree sequences are obtained.
TABLE I. Indicators for the scale-free attribute in BC classification.
Indicators Description
α
Power-law exponent obtained by fitting a power-law de-
gree distribution model.
ntail Number of tail nodes used for fitting.
p
p≥ 0.1: Accept the scale-free hypothesis.
p< 0.1: Reject the scale-free hypothesis.
R
R> 0: The power-law model is much in favor.
R = 0: The data do not permit a distinction between
(power-law or alternative) models.
R < 0: The alternative model (such as the exponential
model) is much in favor.
strongest
90% S:
p > 0.1
ntail > 50
2<α<3
95% S:
R>0
strong
50% S:
p > 0.1
ntail > 50
2<α<3
R>0
weak
50% S:
p > 0.1
ntail > 50
super-weak
50% S:
R > 0
weakest
50% S:
p > 0.1
non-scale-free
FIG. 2. The real-world networks in examination are classified into
six categories10: strongest, strong, weak, weakest, super-weak, and
non-scale-free.
fall into the above five categories are considered as non-
scale-free networks.
Broido and Clauset10 analyzed nearly 1,000 networks in
different domains, and they found that only a small number of
them can be considered as strong scale-free networks. Even
the simplex networks generated by the BA model do not en-
tirely belong to the strong category. Thus, they concluded that
scale-free networks are rare. This classification method has
attracted much attention in the network science community,
and triggered wide discussions recently11,12,32.
III. METHOD
In a computer vision simulation, as an adversarial attack
example, tiny perturbations are added into a panda picture.
It is very difficult for human to find differences between the
attacked picture and the original one. This surprisingly can
make the classification algorithm misjudge it to be a gibbon
picture with a probability of 99.3%20.
In this paper, the idea of adversarial attack is applied to
fool the BC classification introduced in the previous section.
Specifically, by rewiring a few links in the network to alter
the values of the indicators, namely making the indicators ex-
ceed the limit of the original category, the attack can make
the BC classification results go wrong. According to the BC
classification algorithm, the difference between the strong cat-
egory and the weak category is determined by the power-law
exponent α and the indicator R in TABLE I, and the differ-
ence between the weak and weakest categories is determined
by ntail , the number of fitting nodes. It is emphasized that the
power-law exponent α plays an more important role than the
indicator R on determining the strong category10. Therefore,
in this paper, the adversarial attack strategy is designed based
on the measures of both power-law exponent α and number
of fitting nodes ntail .
A network is represented by a graph G = (V,E), where V
and E represent the sets of nodes and links in the network,
respectively. Let Ω represent the set of links in the fully-
connected network with the same set of nodes V . Note that
E is a part of set Ω. Define N = Ω−E as the set of links in
the complementary network of G, namely those in the fully-
connected network but are not in network G.
A. Random Link Rewiring
In the random link rewiring (RLR) scheme, one first ran-
domly selects a link ldelete ∈ E to delete and a link ladd ∈ N to
add at each step time, so as to balance the number of links in
the network. After an attack, the set E and N become E ′ and
N′, respectively:
E ′ = E− ldelete+ ladd , (1)
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N′ = N+ ldelete− ladd . (2)
Thus, one gets a new adversarial network G′ = (V,E ′).
B. Degree Based Link Rewiring
One of the prominent properties of scale-free networks is
that there exist a few nodes with extremely large degrees,
called hubs. These hubs are key to the robustness of the
networks—they make the scale-free networks be highly toler-
ant to random attacks while extremely vulnerable to targeted
attacks33, measured by the connectivity or the average short-
est path-length of the network. Moreover, they play an impor-
tant role in some dynamical processes taking place on the net-
works, like epidemic spreading34,35, information cascading36
and synchronization37,38.
Degree-Addition-based Link Rewiring (DALR).
Roughly divide the links in a scale-free network into three
categories: hub-hub links (links connecting two hubs), hub-
normal links (links connecting one hub and one normal
node), and normal-normal links (links connecting two normal
nodes). Then, DALR is designed based on the following two
operators.
• Deleting a hub-hub link. Since the number of hub-hub
links in a scale-free network are generally quite small,
this condition can be relaxed as follows: first, design an
indicator d(i+ j) to measure the degree of node pairs:
d(i+ j) = di+d j, (3)
where di and d j represent the degrees of nodes vi and
v j, respectively. Then, sort the links according to their
values of d(i+ j), from large to small. The link with the
highest ranking will be chosen to remove.
• Adding a normal-normal link. In order to weaken the
scale-free attribute without changing the network den-
sity, add a normal-normal link, since this operation can
weaken the heterogeneity of the network. Specifically,
the nodes are sorted according to their degree from
small to large, and the link between the pair of uncon-
nected nodes with the smallest sum of degrees is chosen
to connect together.
Degree-Interval-based Link Rewiring (DILR).
The main indicators of strong and weak categories are the
power-law index α and the number of fitting nodes, ntail ,
which are determined by the fitting process. Divide the node
distribution into two parts according to the p value: the tail
of the distribution used for fitting and the others for another
purpose. As is well known, the power-law index α is deter-
mined by the (average) slope of the curve; therefore, if the tail
is steeper with smaller ntail , it will be out of the strong and
weak categories much easily.
Based on the above observations, one can roughly divide
the nodes into three sets: nodes with large degrees (within
γ=20%), nodes with medium degrees (between γ and β , with
β varying from 35% to 70%), and nodes with small degrees
(the remaining ones), as shown in Fig. 3. Denote VL and VM
the nodes of large degrees and medium degrees, respectively.
Then, the following DILR attack strategy is designed.
• Deleting a link between two connected hub nodes. First,
select a node vi ∈VL, and then choose a v j ∈ Ni, where
Ni is the neighboring set of vi, such that v j has the
largest degree among all neighbors of vi. Then, delete
the link between vi and v j.
• Adding a link between two unconnected nodes of
medium degrees. Randomly select two unconnected
nodes from VM , and add a link between them.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Datasets
There are many models for generating scale-free networks:
the BA model5, fitness model39, and local-world evolving net-
work models40–43, etc. In this paper, the most well-known BA
model is adopted to generate simplex networks. Since all the
generated networks are simplex, there will not be the strongest
category. In other words, only the following five categories
are considered here: strong, weak, weakest, super-weak, and
non-scale-free, where the former three are nested, as shown
in Fig. 4. In order to test the robustness of the BC classifi-
cation method, the simulation is to attack the BA network of
different sizes: n = 500, 1000, 2000, respectively, where n is
the number of nodes. For simplicity, the number of links, m,
is set to be 2n.
In the simulation, 500 networks for each size were gen-
erated, and then classified. TABLE II shows the classifica-
tion results, where it can be seen that most (but not all) of
the networks generated by the BA model indeed fall into the
strong category regardless of the sizes of the networks. How-
ever, there are still some networks that cannot be considered
as scale-free networks by the BC classification, specifically
more than 10% of them are considered as super-weak and
very few of them are considered as weak. As the network
size increases, more networks will be classified into the non-
scale-free category.
B. Performance Metrics
1. Metric for effectiveness
When attacking a model or scheme, one always hopes that
the attack could successfully fool the object with a lowest cost,
e.g., changing the least number of pixels to fool a computer vi-
sion model, or rewiring the least number of links to fool a link
prediction or a node classification algorithm. Here, to measure
the effectiveness of different adversarial attack strategies, the
smallest fraction of rewired links needed to successfully fool
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FIG. 3. Illustration of DILR attack strategy. (a) Determine the set of large-degree nodes, VL, and the set of medium-degree nodes, VM ,
according to the degree sequence. (b) Delete the link between two connected hub nodes (note that, here, node v j has the largest degree among
all the neighbors of vi, so it could be either in or not in VL). (c) Add a link between two unconnected nodes of medium degrees.
strong
p > 0.1
ntail > 50
2<α<3
R>0
weak
p > 0.1
ntail > 50
super-weak
R > 0
weakest
p > 0.1
non-scale-free
FIG. 4. Classification of simplex networks generated by the BA
model, in terms of scale-free attribute. Here, strongest and strong
categories are merged into one, the strong category, and the other
four categories keep the same, as suggested by Broido and Clauset10.
TABLE II. Classification results of the BA network of different sizes.
Most (more than 70%) but not all of these BA networks fall into the
strong category.
n strong weak weakest super-weak non-scale-free
500 89.30% 0.30% 0% 10.30% 0%
1000 78% 0% 0% 20.60% 1.40%
2000 73.60% 0.20% 0% 14.60% 11.60%
the BC classification method10 is considered, by changing the
strong category of scale-free networks to another type. The
metric is defined by
∆M =
mR
m
, (4)
where mR is the smallest number of rewired links to realize
a successful attack and m is the total number of links in the
whole network. If a (strong) scale-free network is still in the
strong category after a large perturbation introduced by the at-
tack, i.e., a large fraction of links are rewired, then it is deemed
that the classification algorithm is robust or the attack is less
effective.
2. Metrics for concealment
Generally, rewiring a network not only may change the
scale-free attribute (the objective here), but also may change
other structural properties of the network. In this sense, de-
fenders may utilize certain structural properties to discover the
adversarial attack.
To quantify the concealment of various adversarial attacks,
the following three metrics are proposed for measuring the
structural changes introduced by an attack.
• Relative change of average distance (∆L). The aver-
age distance, or shortest path-length, is defined as
L=
2
n(n−1) ∑i>= j
di j, (5)
where n is the number of nodes and di j is the shortest
path length between nodes vi and v j.
The average shortest path length is a most typical global
characteristic of a network. Due to the existence of
hubs, the average shortest path of a scale-free network
is generally shorter than that of a random network44.
This means that if a network has a strong evidence to
be scale-free, its average path-length should always be
short.
Here, the focus is on the relative change of L introduced
by the attack. Denote by Loriginal and Ladversarial the
average shortest path-length of the original network and
the adversarial network, respectively. Then, the relative
change of L is defined as
∆L=
|Ladversarial−Loriginal |
Loriginal
. (6)
• Relative change of average clustering coefficient
(∆C). Clustering Coefficient45 is defined as the ratio
of the actual number of links among the neighbors of a
node to the maximum possible number of links among
the neighbors. The average clustering coefficient of a
whole network is defined as
C =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
2Ei
ki(ki−1) , (7)
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where ki is the number of neighbors of node vi and Ei is
the actual number of links among the neighbors of vi.
The clustering coefficient, as the most typical local
property, reflects how densely the neighbors of a node
are connected to each other. In scale-free networks, the
probability of having a link between two nodes connect-
ing to the same node is relatively low. As a result, scale-
free networks generally have small average clustering
coefficients.
Similarly, here the focus is on the relative change of
C introduced by the attack. Denote by Coriginal and
Cadversarial the average clustering coefficient of origi-
nal network and the adversarial network, respectively.
Then, the relative change of C is defined as
∆C =
|Cadversarial−Coriginal |
Coriginal
. (8)
• Relative change of diagonal distance (∆D). Diago-
nal distance46, denoted by D, measures the average dis-
tance from the main diagonal of nonzero elements in
the adjacency matrix of a graph, which is defined as
D= dd(A) = 〈dd〉= 1
n2 ∑
(i, j)∈E
ddi j
=
1
n2 ∑
(i, j)∈E
xi j · yi, j
zi j
=
1√
2 ·n2 ∑(i, j)∈E
|i− j|, (9)
where ddi j is the distance of the elements i and j from
the main diagonal of the adjacency matrix A, xi j =
|(i, i)− (i, j)|, yi j = |( j, j)− (i, j)|, zi j =
√
x2i j+ y
2
i j, n
is the number of network nodes, and 〈·〉 is the average
operation.
It was found46 that diagonal distance can be used to de-
tect the dramatic changes in the topology of a network.
Here, the relative change of D is used to measure the
attack concealment, which is defined as
∆D=
|Dadversarial−Doriginal |
Doriginal
, (10)
where Doriginal and Dadversarial are the average diago-
nal distances of the original network and the adversarial
network, respectively.
C. Results
In this study, 100 networks were randomly selected from
the strong category in the generated networks of each size n
to attack, for n = 500, 1000, 2000 respectively, with number
of links m= 2n.
Note that the most important indicators for distinguishing
strong and weak categories are the power-law exponent α and
the indicator R in TABLE I. Therefore, the goal here is to
weak
weakest super-weak
non-scale-free
RLR
DALR
DILR
RLR
DALR
DILR
RLR
DALR
DILR
RLR
DALR
DILR
FIG. 5. Probabilities of adversarial networks to belong to different
categories. The middle pie chart represents the overall results by
considering all the cases (three attack strategies on all the networks
of different sizes). The surrounding pies represent the probabilities
of the adversarial networks generated by different attack strategies
for each category.
make the power-law exponent α be out of the range of the
strong category by using the attack strategies introduced in
Sec. III. An attack is repeated until the network does not meet
the strong category requirement. Then, the resultant adversar-
ial network is reclassified.
The results show that such an attack not only changes the
power-law exponent α , but also changes the indicators p and
ntail , which makes the adversarial networks be chanced to
other categories. However, the probability of falling into each
new category is different. To reduce the contingency of the
attack results, each network is attacked for 200 times and the
mean results are recorded. In the simulation, it was found that
200 times are enough for the probability to converge for the
tested networks.
For the DILR attack strategy, there is a question how to
divide the intervals according to the node degree. In gen-
eral, the degree distribution of a scale-free network satisfies
the Pareto principle, which has been widely used in sociology
and business management, indicating that for a scale-free net-
work the hub nodes are concentrated on the top 20% of the
degree ranking. For this reason, the γ in the DILR strategy is
set to be 20%. However, because it is not clear how to deter-
mine the interval of intermediate node degrees, the indicator
β is tuned among five different values, 35%, 40%, 50%, 60%,
and 70%. The experimental results show that both the proba-
bility of a successful attack and the cost of the attack increase
as β increases. Considering the balance between the two, the
indicator is set as β = 50% in the simulation.
Now, the three attack strategies, RLR, DALR, and DILR,
are applied onto the BA strong scale-free networks of differ-
ent sizes. An attack will be ended as soon as the adversarial
network is not belong to the strong category, no matter it is in
weak, weakest, super-weak or non-scale-free. The following
are three findings.
First, it seems that the probabilities of the adversarial net-
works (obtained by attacking strong scale-free networks) be-
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TABLE III. The minimum fractions of rewired links (∆M) needed for a successful attack, for different attack strategies on networks of different
sizes. Here, the symbol “−−” means that there is no adversarial network belonging to the weakest category when the DALR strategy is applied.
network size attack strategy strong→weak strong→weakest strong→super-weak strong→non-scale-free overall
n= 500
RLR 17.70% 15.60% 17.40% 5.40% 17.30%
DALR 6.40% 6.00% 6.20% 5.40% 6.33%
DILR 3.40% 7.80% 4.10% 4.00% 3.89%
n= 1000
RLR 17.00% 14.91% 16.72% 4.46% 16.19%
DALR 7.56% 9.60% 7.16% 7.60% 7.68%
DILR 5.83% 13.08% 4.47% 3.95% 5.51%
n= 2000
RLR 16.25% 16.38% 16.78% 5.13% 16.07%
DALR 8.28% −− 7.94% 7.60% 8.16%
DILR 10.35% 20.20% 5.50% 6.02% 8.71%
TABLE IV. The metrics of concealment (∆L, ∆C and ∆D) when successfully attack on the networks of different sizes, for different attack
strategies.
Metrics network size attack strategy strong→weak strong→weakest strong→super-weak strong→non-scale-free overall
∆L
n= 500
RLR 2.28% 2.37% 2.32% 1.33% 2.25%
DALR 10.03% 9.21% 9.86% 8.39% 9.96%
DILR 3.31% 6.58% 3.81% 4.10% 3.67%
n= 1000
RLR 2.41% 2.36% 2.34% 1.17% 2.09%
DALR 13.49% 17.40% 13.04% 12.92% 13.08%
DILR 5.72% 11.27% 4.64% 3.23% 5.07%
n= 2000
RLR 2.10% 2.02% 2.06% 0.81% 2.07%
DALR 16.23% −− 15.86% 15.10% 16.08%
DILR 9.75% 16.29% 5.39% 3.50% 7.74%
∆C
n= 500
RLR 31.83% 29.30% 31.89% 17.64% 32.22%
DALR 60.28% 57.41% 61.47% 52.45% 60.90%
DILR 20.82% 38.60% 23.50% 26.80% 23.91%
n= 1000
RLR 31.74% 32.37% 31.54% 13.35% 30.11%
DALR 68.18% 87.09% 68.15% 64.53% 67.75%
DILR 28.96% 53.53% 24.72% 15.75% 26.62%
n= 2000
RLR 28.62% 22.41% 29.79% 9.61% 31.56%
DALR 71.69% −− 71.76% 67.33% 72.85%
DILR 42.30% 64.47% 23.34% 10.02% 35.24%
∆D
n= 500
RLR 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 0.11% 0.05%
DALR 0.00% 0.95% 0.29% 0.59% 0.46%
DILR 0.02% 0.40% 0.06% 0.26% 0.06%
n= 1000
RLR 0.00% 0.16% 0.01% 0.31% 0.11%
DALR 0.01% 0.17%% 0.03% 0.37% 0.13%
DILR 0.00% 0.19% 0.01% 0.04% 0.04%
n= 2000
RLR 0.00% 1.51% 0.04% 0.10% 0.41%
DALR 0.03% −− 0.02% 0.13% 0.03%
DILR 0.03% 0.25% 0.05% 0.50% 0.17%
longing to different categories are quite different. Overall, by
considering all the cases (three attack strategies on the net-
works of different sizes), the adversarial networks are most
likely to be in the weak category (with probability 62.92%),
but are most difficult to be in the weakest category (with prob-
ability 1.75%), as shown in Fig. 5. By comparison, the adver-
sarial networks are relatively easier to be in the super-weak
category, rather than in the non-scale-free category, with prop-
erties 23.96% and 11.37%, respectively. This is because, gen-
erally, it is quite costly (a large number of links need to be
rewired) to make ntail less than 50, especially for those net-
works of large sizes, where ntail ≤ 50 is the threshold to de-
fine the weakest category. On the contrary, the other three pa-
rameters, α , R and p, are more sensitive to the attacks, since
they are determined by the overall curve of the degree distribu-
tion, especially for the first two. Note that the fractions of ad-
versarial networks in different categories are slightly different
by attacks of different strategies, e.g., most of the adversarial
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FIG. 6. The violin plots of the three structural properties, L, C and D, of the networks both before and after the attacks by different strategies.
networks in the weak category are generated by RLR, while
most of those in the other three categories (weakest, super-
weak, non-scale-free) are generated by DILR. But, overall,
these strategies are consistent with each other.
Second, the two heuristic attack strategies are much more
effective than the random rewiring strategy RLR, in the sense
that a smaller ∆M is needed to succeed in the attack, while
among them DILR is the most effective one. As shown in TA-
BLE III, for RLR, which can be considered as random noise,
typically more than 15% links in the original networks need
to be rewired to succeed in the attack (from strong to weak,
weakest, or super-weak). However, surprisingly, only around
5% links need to be rewired when the network is attacked to
become non-scale-free, although such cases are rare. This re-
sult suggests that the BC classification could be robust against
small random noise. More interestingly, when the perturba-
tions are purposefully designed, the BC classification will be
quite vulnerable, i.e., only 3.89% links (38.9 in 1000 links on
average) need to be rewired if DILR is applied to attack the
networks of 500 nodes, much less than the value of 17.30%
by RLR. It seems that, as the network size increases, it is
more difficult to succeed in an attack, e.g., the fractions of
rewired links for both DALR and DILR steadily increases as
the network size increases. Even so, the number of rewired
links needed by DALR or DILR is only half of those needed
by RLR, when the networks have 2000 nodes and 4000 links.
By comparison, DILR is generally more effective than DALR,
i.e., a smaller number of links are needed to succeed in attack
when DILR is applied rather than DALR.
Third, the adversarial attack will not change the network
structure by too much, i.e., the relative changes of L, C, and D
introduced by DILR are comparable with those introduced by
RLR. It is well known that the average shortest path-length L
and the average clustering coefficient C are good for charac-
terizing the global and local properties, respectively. On the
other hand, the recently proposed diagonal distance D is also
a global property useful for detecting the dramatic changes
in the topology of a network46. Here, the relative changes of
these three properties are used, i.e., ∆L, ∆C, and ∆D, between
the original networks and the adversarial networks, to measure
if these properties will dramatically change under adversarial
attacks. The results are presented in TABLE IV. It is found
that, overall, ∆L introduced by DILR is larger than those in-
troduced by RLR, but much smaller than that introduced by
DALR, and that DILR and RLR have comparable ∆C, around
30%, which is only half of that introduced by DALR. All the
three attack strategies introduce very small ∆D, i.e., lower
than 1%. Note that, here ∆C is relatively large for all the three
attack strategies, because BA scale-free networks do not have
many triangular motifs, thus have very small average cluster-
ing coefficients. Consequently, a very small perturbation on a
triangular structure will lead to a huge change of ∆C according
to Eq. (8). To statistically compare the original networks and
the adversarial networks generated by each attack strategy, the
violin plots is shown for the three structural properties, i.e., L,
C and D, of the networks, both before and after an attack,
as shown in Fig. 6. It is found that the shortest path-length
increases and the clustering coefficient decreases after the at-
tack, while the diagonal distance remains almost the same.
This is reasonable, since the attack focuses on destroying the
scale-free property, which will weaken the dominant role of
hub nodes and further increase the shortest path-length. On
the other hand, the global random rewiring operations in the
three strategies may also destruct triangles in these networks,
leading to smaller clustering coefficients. In general, DILR
has comparable concealment as RLR, both of which introduce
relatively small changes of L, C and D; while DALR causes
dramatic changes of the network structures, thus could be rel-
atively easy to detect.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the robustness of the scale-
free network classification method proposed by Broido and
Clauset10, referred to as BC classification herein. In so doing,
three attack strategies, RLR, DALR and DILR, are proposed
and tested. The attack experiments on strong scale-free net-
works generated by the BA model show that the BC classifica-
tion method is vulnerable to adversarial attacks, e.g., only 6%
links need to be rewired to successfully attack a strong scale-
free network such that it becomes a weak, weakest, super-
weak, or even non-scale-free network. In addition, the BC
classification result is not as good as described10: The cost
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of transforming a strong network into the weakest category
is even higher than the cost of transforming it into the non-
scale-free category, which indicates that there is no layered
relationship between these categories.
This paper has examined four indicators in the BC classifi-
cation method: p, ntail , R, and α . Among these indicators, the
values of p and α can be easily changed by slightly disturb-
ing the network structure, while ntail and R show relatively
strong robustness. This results in unbalanced distributions of
the adversarial networks in different categories. For instance,
since the requirement of the weakest category is ntail > 50,
it is extremely difficult to attack a strong scale-free network
to change it to be in the weakest category, especially when
the network is relatively large. Therefore, one should con-
sider the robustness for each indicator when trying to propose
a new classification method.
This study may provide a different perspective to the ar-
guable definition of scale-free networks. Moreover, beyond
the scale-free feature, in complex networks there are also
many other physical criteria derived from real-world data.
Therefore, a suggestion is to adopt similar methods to test
their robustness against various adversarial attacks.
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